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THE NON-GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT A CREATURE OF THE POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
ACT OF 1951*
ALLAN McCOIDf

In the course of the past fifty years, during which estate planning
has become a specialty rather than one of many jobs handled by the
general practitioner, the power of appointment has become an increasingly popular form of gift. The two great advantages which have been
claimed for the power are the introduction of great flexibility into the
estate plan and the reduction of the tax burden on the property as it
passes from one generation to another.1 It was presumably with both
of these objectives in mind that Professor William J. Bowe made a
suggestion last year as to a form of power 2 which, if widely accepted
by estate planners, may make the following provision a familiar sight
in wills in the near future:
I give the rest and residue of my estate, real and personal, to the X Trust
Co., to hold in trust and to pay the income to my son, Doe, for his life and
on his death to distribute the principal to such person or persons, other
than Doe, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate, in such
interests or estates as Doe shall create by will or deed attested by two
witnesses, and in default of appointment to Doe's issue who survive him
per stirpes, and if Doe die without issue him surviving to Vanderbilt
University.

Prior to 1918, the donee of a power of appointment was not recognized as the owner of the appointive property for federal estate tax
purposes. 3 Rather the donee was considered as merely an agent of the
donor, passing the property to other people from the donor himself.4
Between 1918 and 1951, the federal law varied from taxing only gen* The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Professors A. James
Casner of Harvard Law School and William J. Bowe of Vanderbilt Law School
who read this article and made valuable suggestions.
t Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California,
Los Angeles.

1. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY 1808-09, 1810-11 (1940); Griswold and Leach,

Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HAav. L. REV. 929, 961
(1939); Schuyler, Some Problems with Powers, 45 ILL. L. REV. 57, 58-59 (1950).
2. See Bowe, Estate Tax Planningunder the Powers of Appointment Act of
1951, 5 VAm. L. REv. 197, 199 (1952). But see Lauritzen, Drafting Powers of
Appointment under the 1951 Act, 47 N.W.L. REv. 314, 318 (1952); McLucas,
Taxation of Powers of Appointment under the New Law, 31 TRUST BULL. 26,
35 (1951).
3. United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617 (1921);
Note, 18 A.L.R. 1470 (1922).
4. De Charette v. De Charette, 264 Ky. 525, 94 S.W.2d 1018 (1936); Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277 (1849); see also 3 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 679680 (3d ed. 1939); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 318, comment b (1940); id. at 1811.

For a discussion of the nature of powers, see Callahan and Leach, Powers of
Appointment, 5 A.mERiCAx LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 23.1-23.5 (Casner ed. 1952).
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eral powers of appointment which were exercised 5 to taxing all powers
other than a few exempted ones.6 This latter form of taxation was
severely criticized by property lawyers7 and in 1951 Congress returned
the taxation of powers to a position somewhat similar to that existing
under the original 1918 act: including in the donee's estate a general
power if it is possessed by the donee at his death or if he has exercised
it in contemplation of death, and taxing as a gift the exercise of a
general power. 8 A "general power" is defined as one which is exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of
his estate, with specific exceptions for a power to invade principal in
accordance with an ascertainable standard or a power held in conjunction with certain other persons. 9
The power stated in the terms of the Internal Revenue Code seems
on its face to satisfy the twin desiderataof giving broad flexibility to
the donee of the power and at the same time not making either the
appointive property nor the exercise of the power taxable to the donee
or his estate. But does it raise such problems in the application of the
established rules of property law relating to powers of appointment
as to make its use undesirable? It is the purpose of this article to view
some of the situations which may cause trouble in the use of this
power and to consider whether the benefits to be gained outweigh
the possible detriments. Specifically the questions to be considered
are: 10
5. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(e), 40 STAT. 1097 (1919).
6. Revenue Act of 1942, § 403(a), 56 STAT. 942 (1942) (estate tax); id. at
§ 452 (a) (gift tax). Prior to this act, the gift tax provisions of the Code had
not dealt specifically with the exercise of powers as gifts. The gift tax law
of 1932 had only included "transfer... in trust or otherwise, whether the gift
is direct or indirect .... " Revenue Act of 1932, § 501(b), 47 STAT. 245 (1932).
Although no particular aid is obtained from the Treasury Regulations with
respect to this section, U.S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2 (1933), the Regulations under the 1942 Act indicate that transfers by an exercise of a general power
between 1932 and 1942 were considered as taxable under the original gift tax
provisions. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(b) (1943). See Commissioner v. Solomon, 124 F.2d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1941). But see Griswold, Powers of Appointment
and the Federal Estate Tax, 52 HARV. L. REV. 929, 953 (1939).
7. See, e.g., Browne, Taxation of Powers of Appointment and the Need to
Break the Impasse, 27 TRUST BULL. 12, 13, 16-17 (1947); Buck, Craven and
Shackelford, Treatment of Powers of Appointment for Estate and Gift Tax
Purposes, 34 VA. L. REV. 255, 259-61 (1948); Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means on H.R. 3533, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1752 (July 17, 1947) (statement of W. A. Sutherland).
8. INT. REV. CODE §§ 811(f) (2), 1000 (c) (2).
9. INT. REV. CODE §§ 811(f) (3), 1000(c) (3). For a more detailed history of
the taxation of appointive assets and powers under the federal law, see
Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HARv. L. REV. 55, 55-64 (1951).
10. While this list is not intended to preclude the possibility of other problems arising under this power, these three are the ones most likely to arise
and therefore deserve the major consideration. Some problems or questions
are rather clearly eliminated by the terms of the power itself: since the power
is too broad to indicate any intention on the part of the donor that there be
an appointment to every object or any proportioning of appointments, there
will be no question of non-exclusive powers or illusory appointments. Cf. 5
Ami
cAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 23.57, 23.58 (Casner ed. 1952). Due to the in-
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1) Will the donee be able to exercise the power so as to confer any
benefit on himself or his creditors?
2) Will the creditors of the donee be allowed to reach the appointive
assets in a court of equity following an appointment by the donee?
3) How is the Rule against Perpetuities to be applied to this power?

I
Before discussing these three questions, however, there are two preliminary questions which should be considered because of the very
breadth of the power and its rather unusual terminology. The first
of these is whether the courts will recognize this as a proper power.
The second is how they will characterize it.
It is an established doctrine that the courts do not uphold trusts
which have over-broad or vague definitions of beneficiaries, except
where the trust is for charity." While a power to appoint to anyone
within the discretion of the donee is certainly recognized, will a court
recognize the power quoted above which attempts to limit the discretion of the donee but sets up no specific class of beneficiaries? This
same question was raised in England by In re Park some 22 years
ago. 12 There the power allowed the donee to appoint to anyone in the
world except herself. The persons attacking this power argued to the
chancery court that, while the testator might have given either a
general power or a power to appoint to a restricted class of persons,
he could not create this unusual power which in effect allowed the
donee to make the testator's will for him. The court held the power
valid, saying that the division of powers into "general" and "restricted"
powers was not exhaustive.
Although powers to appoint to anyone except named persons are
not common, they have been used from time to time and several other
determinate class of objects set up by the power, there can be no implied gift
in default of appointment if no specific gift in default is included. Id. at §§
23.62, 23.63. Any argument that an attempted exercise of the power makes the
appointive property so much that of the donee that it should pass to his estate
in default is precluded by the express exclusion of the estate as a potential
taker. Id. at § 23.61.
One question which might raise some problems is that of state taxation of
the power under inheritance or estate taxes. A few states do not tax the power
or appointive property in the hands of the donee nor its transfer as a transfer
by him. Many states tax property passing under the exercise of powers without distinguishing the type of power involved. Some states follow the current
federal law on this question. A few have their own rule of taxing only general
powers, e.g., AnIz. CoDE ANx. § 40-105(5) (1939); CCH INH., EST. & GMr TAX
REP. ff 1540 et seq. (7th ed. 1950). Under this latter type of statute, the significant factor is whether the power is general or not. The discussion in the
main body of the article of the incidence of the federal estate and gift taxes
on the power applies equally well to these state laws.
11. See 1 ScowT, TRUSTS §§ 112, 123 (1939).
12. [19321 1 Ch.580 (1931).
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courts have dealt with them without questioning their validity.13 In
one state a power to appoint to anyone by will is treated as one which
may not be exercised in favor of the donee's creditors or estate. 14 Under
this rule the federal courts have held such powers non-taxable. 15 Both
the American Law of Property and the Restatement of Property,while
saying that such powers are unusual, see no reason to question their
validity.1 6
Many of the rules which have been developed by the courts in dealing with powers distinguish "general" and "special" powers. If, at the
outset, we can characterize the Doe power as one or the other, we may
have a key to the other problems.
With only slight differences in phraseology, courts and writers make
the distinction between general and special powers of appointment
in the following terms: a general power is one which may be exercised in favor of anyone including the donee or his estate; a special
power is one which may be exercised only in favor of a class of
designated persons, not including the donee of his estate. 17 The Restatement of Property narrows the latter definition by stating:
A power is special ... if (a) it can be exercised only in favor of persons,

not including the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large,
and (b) the donor does not manifest an intent to create or reserve the
power primarily for the benefit of the donee.18

Comment a to this Section specifically says that a power exercisable
"to any person except the donee" is not considered as either general or
special. Rather, the Restatement would treat such a power as a hybrid,
to be considered general in some situations and special in others.19
The authors of Part 23 of the American Law of Property, dealing
with powers, in commenting on the Restatement's exclusion from the
class of "special powers" of powers exercisable in favor of "an unreasonably large group" or powers "primarily for the benefit of the
donee," say that although such cases are unlikely to arise with con13. Christine S. Kendrick, 34 B.T.A. 1040 (1936); In re Byron's Settlement,
[18913 3 Ch. 474; Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ex. 1840),
affd sub nom., Drake v. Attorney General, 10 Cl. & F. 257, 8 Eng. Rep. 739
(H.L. 1843); Edie v. Babington, 3 Ir. Ch. Rep. 568 (1854).
14. Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888); see Galard, Prince
de Bearn et Chalais v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 472, 74 Atl. 626, 631 (1909); Prince
v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 111, 63 Atl. 209, 210 (1906).
15. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931).
16. 5 AmEcAN LAw OF PROPERTY 491 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 323, comment h (1940).
17. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 81, 60 Sup. Ct. 424, 84 L. Ed. 585
(1940); Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 292, 156 Atl. 84, 85 (1931). For
statutory definitions, see, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 134, 135; RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 320, comment c (1940). FARWELL, PowEas 7 k2d ed. 1893); SUGDEN,
PowERs 394 (8th ed. 1861).
18. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 320 (2) (1940) (Emphasis added).
19. Id. at § 320, comment a.
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siderable frequency, it "is likely that the exclusions were made because
of a belief that should powers of these types appear separate rules
might be required for them."'20 In line with the Restatement comment,
these separate rules might be determined on the basis of the policy
underlying the present rules as to general and special powers.
Two writers, one American and one English, have devoted articles
to a consideration of the powers which do not fall within the traditional definitions of general or special powers. 21 Both conclude that the
hybrid powers cannot be characterized as either general or special
for all purposes. Each analyzes the situations in which the courts have
laid down rules governing powers to discover the reasons behind these
rules and then classifies the hybrid powers for the purpose of each
situation.
This same variation in classification of such powers depending upon
the exact language of the power and the purpose behind the existing
rules is illustrated by the following cases:
In Platt v. Routh,22 the donor gave to his daughter a life estate and
the power to appoint at her death to any person or persons (other
than J. W. and his relations, V. H. and his relations and the relations
of the daughter's late husband). When the daughter appointed, the
question of the imposition of a legacy duty under Section 18, Legacy
Duty Act, 1796,23 was raised. This section taxed property passing
subject to a general power as having been given to the donee absolutely and property appointable only to specific persons as being
transferred directly from the donor to those persons appointed. The
court said that since the power fitted neither category, some violence
must be done to the words of the statute and it seemed better to treat
the power as general. "The question in such cases is, not whether
there are persons to whom the fund could not have been given, but
whether the party executing the power might have executed it for his
own benefit, i.e. in payment of his own debts."2 4 At the same time a
probate duty was not levied on the ground that the executor could
not claim the property qua executor since it was not property "for
or in respect of which the probate is granted." This decision was affirmed in the House of Lords, 25 the Lords saying that the section dealing with general powers subject to the legacy duty was intended to
cover all but powers for the benefit of persons specially named.
In Edie v. Babington,26 the testator bequeathed a sum in trust for E
20. 5 A. micAN LAW OF PROPERTY 491 (Casner ed. 1952).

21. Gold, The Classification of Some Powers of Appointment, 40 MicH. L.

REV. 337 (1942); Fleming, Hybrid Powers, 13 CoNv. 20 (1948).
22. 6 M. & W. 756, 151 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ex. 1840).
23. 36 Geo. III, c. 52.
24. Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756, 789, 151 Eng. Rep. 618, 631 (Ex. 1840).
25. Drake v. Attorney-General, 10 Cl. & F. 257, 8 Eng. Rep. 739 (H.L. 1843).
26. 3 Ir Ch. Rep. 568 (1854).
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for life and on her death one third to go as she appointed by her last
will, the power so given not to be exercised in favor of "any person
named John Bateman." The general creditors of the donee were allowed to reach the assets when an appointment was made in E's will,
the court relying on the discussion in Platt v. Routh, presumably since
there the decision had turned on the possibility of appointing the
assets for the benefit of the donee or the payment of his debts.
In In re Byron's Settlement 27 property was conveyed in trust for the
life of R and on her death to such persons other than her husband
and his friends or relations as R appointed by deed or will. After her
husband's death, R died making a general devise of her personal and
real property. The question was raised whether there was a general
power so as to make the devise an appointment under Section 27 of
the Wills Act.23 The court held that there was no general power, since
a donee limited to all the world save X lacked the equivalent of
ownership necessary for a general devise of owned property to act as
an exercise of the power. Although the husband had died, there was
a possible limitation on appointment due to the exclusion of his
friends and relations, which the court felt was capable of being given
effect if the occasion arose.
As is indicated by these cases, the dichotomy of general and special
powers is not merely one of form, but is basically the difference between powers which in effect make the donee the owner of the appointive property, and those in which he is not actually in the position
of an owner. As Professor W. Barton Leach has phrased it:
"Where a general power is given, the property is surrendered to the donee
to do with as he pleases for the benefit of no one but himself. Where a
special power is given the object of the gift is no longer the donee but the
class to whom appointment is to be made, and the donee takes the position

of one who is to direct the distribution of property for the benefit of the
class, not of himself. The practical ownership of the donee of a general
power and the quasi-fiduciary position of the donee of a special power

lie at the root of many of the distinctions in the law of property."2 9

The real question in the characterization of a power as general or
special is what the donor intended.3 0 Did he intend to make the donee
the true owner of the property or only to use him as a sort of agent
in the distribution of the property to the true objects of his bounty?
With this background, how are the courts to characterize the power
with which we are concerned? Since there is no special class of bene27. [1891] 3 Ch. 474.
28. Wills Act, 1837, 7 WM. IV &1 VIcT., c. 26, § 27.
29.

LEAcH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

(2d ed. 1940).
30. 5 AmERcAN LAW
PROPERTY § 324 (1940).

OF PROPERTY

§

23.11 (Casner ed. 1952);

577-78

RESTATEMENT,
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ficiaries designated by the donor of the power, there appear to be no
persons other than the donee who are to be considered as the objects
of the donor's interest. Rather he gave the donee almost full control
over the property limiting his discretion only to exclude four objects,
the donee himself, his estate, his creditors and the creditors of the
estate. It seems difficult, therefore, to classify this as a "special
power" as that term has been used in the past.
It might be argued with some merit that since an exercise of the
power will appoint only the remainder after the donee's death, his
own exclusion is of no importance. Likewise the exclusion of the
estate is only a slight limitation, since he may appoint to anyone who
could take from his estate except the creditors. Also, as we have seen
above, the taxing authorities may be unable to benefit from the donee's
possession or exercise of the power. Thus the conclusion might be
reached that the purpose of the particular limitations on the donee's
discretion is not to benefit others but to benefit the donee himself by
keeping the property out of the hands of creditors or the taxing authorities and thereby preventing a reduction of its value in the hands
of the donor. Both the American Law of Propertyand the Restatement
indicate that where the donor has manifested an intention to create a
power primarily for the benefit of the donee, it may be treated as a
general power for some purposes.31
Does it follow from this that the present power must be primarily
classified as general? To do so in all cases would probably mean that
the creditors and the taxing authorities would be allowed to reach
the property. Furthermore it would seem to disregard the traditional
definition of a general power as one exercisable in favor of anyone
including the donee himself. Therefore a preliminary characterization
of the power as "non-general" seems preferable. This term indicates
that the power is not clearly general and at the same time does not
bring it within the class of special powers.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, let us now examine
the three individual problems which may arise with respect to the
exercise of a non-general power and the arguments which may be
made in favor of the various possible treatments of the power and its
exercise.
H
In dealing with attempts by the donee to exceed the discretion given
him by the donor, a distinction must be made between "excessive"
and "fraudulent" appointments. 32 An "excessive" appointment occurs
31. 5 AmEvicAN LAw OF PROPERTY 492 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMIENT,
PROPERTY § 320, comment a (1940).
32. See 1 SimES, FuTURE INTERESTS § 290 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

1947-48 (1940); Note, 42 HARV. L. REv. 419, 420 (1929).
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when the donee makes a direct appointment to one outside the objects
of the power or appoints an interest greater than that permitted by
the power. 33 A "fraudulent" appointment occurs when the donee gives
the appointive assets to an object but attaches thereto a condition
benefiting a non-object or appoints with the intention of conferring
a benefit on a non-object.3 While the two are alike in that the
donor's intentions have been disregarded by the donee, the effect of
the two types of appointments may be different.3 5
It is clear that the donee did not get a power to give the property
directly to himself, his estate or the creditors of either. To permit him
to make such a direct appointment would be in direct violation of the
terms of the power. Therefore any "excessive" appointment should be
considered void in all cases.
The donor has manifested no intention of benefiting anyone other
than the donee, however, and may be treated as manifesting an intention to increase the benefit to the donee by removing the burdens
of taxation of the property for some time and by making the property
free from the claims of the donee's creditors. The exclusion of the
donee as a potential appointee may only mean that the donor did not
want the property to become so much the donee's that the tax authori3
6 The donee may argue that he
ties or the creditors could reach it.
benefit from the appointment
indirect
an
receive
should be allowed to
others for services rendered
repay
to
attempt
may
He
of the property.
37
to him. He may supply a potential surety with sufficient property to
support a bond. 38 He may attempt to contract with an appointee to
support him for the rest of his life.39 None of these hypothetical appointments disregard the intention of the donor, the donee will argue.
Although each of these has been treated as a fraudulent appointment
under more restricted powers,40 the court faced with this "non-general"
33. E.g., In re Trowbridge's Estate, 124 Misc. 317, 208 N.Y. Supp. 662 (Surr.
Ct. 1924) (power limited to lineal descendants exercised in favor of husband
and educational institution); Daniel v. Brown, 156 Va. 563, 159 S.E. 209 (1931)
(power limited to nephews and nieces exercised in favor of grand-nephews and
grand-nieces).
34. E.g., Sikes v. Sikes, 163 Ga. 510, 136 S.E. 523 (1927) (land appointed to
object who never obtained possession and who deeded back to donee immediately); Horn v. Sayer, 184 Ill. App. 326 (1913) (land appointed to objects
who deed immediately to stranger who has contracted with donee); In re
Carroll's Will, 274 N.Y. 288, 8 N.E.2d 864 (1937) (at time of drawing will
appointing to object, appointee agreed to pay large portion of property over to
non-object).
35. The authorities cited in note 32 supra point out that "excessive" appointments are treated as void and may be separated from other appointments
which are valid, while "fraudulent" appointments are only voidable but may
taint the entire exercise of the power.
36. See supra pp. 57-58.
37. Cf.Chenoweth v. Bulitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W.2d 1061 (1928).
38. Cf. Bostick v. Winton, 33 Tenn. 304 (1853).
39. Cf. Shank v. Dewitt, 44 Ohio St. 237, 6 N.E. 255 (1886); In re Wright,
[1920] 1 Ch. 108.

40. See cases cited notes 37-39 supra.
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power and the argument just made might consider these as valid appointments.
While the above analysis seems plausible as far as it goes, the court
in following this line of reasoning in reality is saying that this is a
general power. From this it is only a short step to treating the "nongeneral" power in the same way for the purpose of taxation. The
Internal Revenue Code does not say that a power which is not exercisable directly in favor of the donee, his estate or the creditors of
either is not a general power, but only that one so exercisable is.4 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said
that a power general on its face is not general for tax purposes since it
cannot be exercised in favor of the donee's estate or creditors under
state law.4 This indicates that the courts will not consider the words.
of the power alone in determining the "general" nature of the power
for tax purposes.
Some question might arise as to whether, in the face of the statutory
language, all powers which might be exercised so as indirectly to
benefit the donee should be taxed as property of the donee or only
those which are so exercised. To adopt the latter rule would give the
donee the ability to determine the taxability of the appointive property. The fact that the tax is imposed not on a power which is exercised but on one which may be exercised in favor of the donee
indicates a Congressional intention to impose the tax not on the basis
of exercise but on the basis of the type of power involved. 43 Therefore
the broader rule of taxing any power which may be exercised so as
to benefit the donee indirectly would be the preferable one.
With this possibility of taxation of the appointive assets as those
of the donee, the argument against allowing the donee to so exercise
the power as to confer an indirect benefit on himself or his estate
becomes stronger. The donor did not intend that a tax be imposed
on the donee because of his possession or exercise of the power. Any
result which will impose such a burden would be a violation of the
donative intent. For this reason the court should refuse to permit
any indirect benefit to the non-objects of the power, treating it as a
"fraud on the power."
The donee may also attempt to appoint the assets to an object in
return for the payment of his debts. In addition to the arguments made
above against permitting indirect benefit to the donee himself, the
takers in default of appointment or the trustee of the assets will be able
to argue that an indirect benefit to the creditors is clearly in violation
of the donor's intentions.
41. INT. REV. CODE §§ 811(f) (3), 1000 (c)(3).

42. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1931). For comment on this case
during the debate on the 1951 act, see 97 CONG. REc. 5000 (1951).

43. See, H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1942); SE.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1942); 88 CONG. REC.6379-80 (1942).

REP. No.
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III
In spite of the fact that under the express terms of the "non-

general" power the donee cannot make any direct appointment to his
creditors, and under the analysis just made can confer no indirect
benefit on them, the creditors may attempt to reach the property
subject to the power if the donee makes a testamentary appointment
to others or an inter vivos appointment which if made as to owned
property would be a fraud on creditors. This attempt may be based on
an argument that for this purpose the donee should be treated as the
owner of the appointive property.
Although in most cases the courts have treated appointive property
as that of the donor until the time of appointment, they sometimes
have recognized that where the donee of a general power exercises
it his creditors may be able to reach the assets as if they were the
donee's.44 This has been justified on two grounds. First, the courts
argue that the donee having exercised dominion over the property
as if it were his own, the court will treat it as his for the purpose
of paying his creditors, 45 or in more poetic terms, the donee must "be
just before being generous. '46 Sometimes the court speaks of inter47
vening to take the property as it passes through the donee's hands.
This rationalization has been attacked by courts and commentators
'who have said that if the donee is to be treated as the owner of
the property, then the court should logically treat him as such without
regard to what the donee actually does, or that if the property is not
his absolutely it is improper to apply it to the payment of his debts. 48
Second, the court may look upon the rule allowing the creditors to
reach the appointive assets as a rule of equity, rather than one of
law, which disregards the question of who "owns" the property. 49
This may in fact underlie the first rationale and answer its critics. In
at least one case this led a court to ignore the specific provisions in
the instrument creating the power which prohibited the creditors
44. 5 AA'rERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.16 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SviES, FUTURE
INTERESTS 466 (1936); 3 TnFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 85-86 (3d ed. 1939); Note,
27 VA. L. REV. 1052 (1941).
45. Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N.H. 298, 41 Am.Dec. 694 (1844); see Holmes v.
Coghill, 7 Ves. Jr. 499, 506, 32 Eng. Rep. 201, 203-04 (Ch. 1802).
46. In re Harvey's Estate, 13 Ch. 216, 222 (1879); see Mayberry v. Redmond,
169 Tenn.190, 195, 83 S.W.2d 897, 899 (1935).
47. Townshend v. Windham, 2 Ves. Sr. 1, 11, 28 Eng. Rep. 1, 7 (Ch. 1750);
see Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, 279 (1849); Harrington v. Harte,
1 Cox Eq. 131, 132, 29 Eng. Rep. 1094, 1095 (1784).
48. St. Mathews Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W.2d 471 (1935);
Wales v. Bowdish's Ex'r, 61 Vt. 23, 17 Atl. 1000 (1889); see Commonwealth v.
Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, 279-81 (1849); see 5 AZERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY 501
(Casner ed. 1952); 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 467-68 (1936); 3 TnFFAy, REAL
PROPERTY § 710 (3d ed. 1939).
49. See O'Grady v. Wilmot, [19163 2 A.C. 231, 245-46, 248; Holmes v. Coghill,
7 Ves. Jr. 499, 506, 32 Eng. Rep. 201, 203, 204 (Ch. 1802); see 5 A-ERcAN LAW
OF PROPERTY 501 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 SnEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 469 (1936);
Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 1052, 1057 (1941).
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from reaching the property subject to the general power, 50 a principle
51
which has also been announced by legal writers other than the courts.
In several states, statutes have been enacted which give creditors
rights whether or not a general or beneficial power is exercised.5 2
The argument might be made by the creditors of the donee of the
"non-general" power that since the donee has a life estate and a very
broad power, the court of equity should treat him as the owner of
the appointive assets at least for the purpose of making the property
subject to his debts. Yet, the fact remains that the donor has specifically forbidden the donee to make any direct appointment to his creditors. The reasons outlined above which might lead a court to hoid
that the donee could confer an indirect benefit on himself would not i'e
applicable here, since the donor has manifested an intention to exclude the creditors from any benefit from this property. And, as we
have seen above, the tax effect of allowing any benefit to the donee
of the question of' who may
should enter into a court's consideration
53
benefit from the exercise of the power.
But, the creditors will say, the courts do not always follow.the
intentions of the donor in determining whether or not the creditors
may reach the appointive property. Had the donor given the donee. a
general power with the provision that no part of the trust funds should
become liable for or be paid for the debts or liabilities of the donee, the
court might disregard these words.5 4 The "non-general" power may be
50. State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25, 121 A.LVR.

796 (1939).
51. 5 Ama1VizcAN LAW
THRiFT TRUSTS

(1940).

OF

PROPERTY 503 (Casner ed.

§ 97 (2d ed. 1947);

1952); GRiswowD, SPixn-

RESTATEMIENT, PROPERTY

52. Most of these statutes follow N.Y.

REAL PROP. LAW

§ 329, comment c

§§ 149, 153, treating

a general power attached to a life estate as an absolute interest in the property.
See 5 AmR.TcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.17 (Casner ed. 1952). Minnesota has
merely provided that all general powers shall be subject to creditors' claims.
Mn. STAT. ANN. § 502.70 (West 1947).

The New York law also provides that the creditors of a donee having "a

special and beneficial power" shall be able to reach it to the same extent as
other interests which cannot be reached by execution. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 159. Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522, 541-42 (1881), indicates that only special powers in which the donee alone has an interest are subject to the
creditors under this provision. Other states following New York on this point
are: ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 92 (1940); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1010 (1951); Mien.
CovP. LAWS § 556.21 (1948); N.D. REv. CODE § 59-0550 (1943); ORIA. STATi. tit.
60, § 274 (1951); S.D. CODE § 59-0451 (1939); Wis. STAT. § 232.20 (1951).,
53. The Commissioner has issued an unpublished ruling to the effect that
even though a power in the terms of the statute may be treated as general
for the purposes of allowing creditors to reach the assets, it will not be taxed.
See Johnson, Powers of Appointment, 29 TAXEs 965, 970 (1951); Lauritzen,
Drafting Powers of Appointment under the 1951 Act, 47 N.W.L. REV. 314, 318
n.25 (1952). But reliance upon this ruling without more authority may not
be too wise. Also there is the possibility that the tax statute itself might be
changed if this form of power were used too extensively.
54. See State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25, 121
A.L.R. 796 (1939); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 503 (Casner ed. 1952); RE.STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 329, comment c (1940).
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interpreted as saying the same thing. During his lifetime, the donee is
given the income, but the principal is not in his hands and so is not
normally subject to his debts. As stated above, the restrictions on his
appointments really limit him only by forbidding an appointment to
creditors. 55 While the property is not inalienable in the hands of
the donee, his creditors are denied any rights in it by the terms of the
trust. Except where there are statutory provisions as to a spendthrift
trust which are not satisfied by this language, 56 the trust may be
57
treated as a form of spendthrift trust.
While many jurisdictions accept the spendthrift trust as applied
to gifts of income,58 there are objections to its use as applied to interests in fee or similar interests which. extend beyond the life of the
beneficiary. 9 "The purpose of a spendthrift trust, however phrased, is
to provide a secure living for the beneficiary," 60 and no restraint beyond his lifetime can be justified by this purpose. 61 Following this
theory, the creditors may argue that the appointive assets must be subjected to their claims if the owned property of the donee is inadequate
and if he exercises the power.
One objection which might be made to this line of argument is
that the donee has only a power, which is not treated as an interest
in property. 62 This point is debatable, 63 however, and may not be
too well-taken before a court which gives a liberal interpretation to
the nature of the powers.
Another argument of the creditors will be based on a comment in
the Restatement of Property:
"The rule stated in this Section [that the exercise of a general power
subjects the property to all claims of creditors) applies in spite of the
manifestation of a contrary intent by the donor or the donee or both.
Thus it is immaterial that the donor provides in the instrument creating
the power that the property covered thereby shall in no circumstances be
64
appointed to the donee's creditors or subjected to their claims."

55. See suprapp. 58-59.
56. See discussion of statutory requirements, GRISWOLD,

§§ 61-79 (2d ed. 1947).

SPENDTnRIFT TRUSTS

57. Although the term "spendthrift trust" is normally applied to restraints on
the right to receive income and includes restraints on the beneficiaries' power
to alienate the property, id. at 2-3, the term has also come to stand for a trust
the assets of which the creditors may not reach, and it is so used here.
58. See id. at 42-43.
59. Lane v. Lane, 8 Allen 350 (Mass. 1864); McCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va.
80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922); see also GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 84-96, 106
(2d ed. 1947). But see LA. REv. STAT. § 1923 (1950); NEV.COmp. LAws § 6880.04
(Supp. 1941); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.25 (1951).
60. Bucknam v. Bucknam, 294 Mass. 214, 219, 200 N.E. 918, 921 (1936).
61. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 104-05 (2d ed. 1947).

62. See Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property, 22 ILL. L. REv.
480, 488-90 (1928), for a discussion of this point.
63. Ibid. See also GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 465 (4th ed., Roland
Gray, 1942); 3 TIFrAwY, REAL PROPERTY 3-4 (3d ed. 1939).
64. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 329, comment c (1940).
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There are also statements in some Massachusetts cases 65 and in the
American Law of Property66 and Dean Erwin N. Griswold's treatise
on Spendthrift Trusts, 67 to the effect that a general power may not be
limited by spendthrift provisions. If the court refuses to give effect
to the limitations on the power, then the creditors may be allowed to
reach the appointive assets.
An examination of the Massachusetts cases indicates some doubt as
to whether they are really decisive in the present situation. In Hill v.
Treasurer68 there is dictum to the effect that an equitable rule subjecting the property to the claims of creditors "would operate even in the
face of his [donor's] testamentary declaration to the contrary."6 9 However, the question before the court was whether the property was the
donee's for the purposes of state inheritance taxation, and the court
decided that it was not. Further, there was no restriction on the
general power in that case.
In Clapp v. Ingraham,70 which Dean Griswold cites as authority on
the point that the donor cannot impose spendthrift restrictions on a
general power, 71 the court specifically said that the spendthrift provisions were never intended by the donor to be applicable to the
power but only to other gifts, thereby avoiding any direct question
of whether the donor could impose such restrictions on a general
power.
The one case which appears to have squarely faced the problem
of restrictions imposed on the general power is State Street Trust Co.
v. Kissel.72 There the donor had created a trust for her grandchildren,
to pay them the income for life, and on the death of each to pay over
the portion of principal from which that grandchild had received income "'to such person or persons as such grandchild by its last will
and testament directs and appoints to receive the same, but in no
event shall any part of said trust funds by [sic] liable for, or be paid
or appropriated to or for any debts or liabilities of such grandchildren .. .. 1 ,,3 One of the grandchildren had appointed to certain
persons who were his creditors, apparently in payment of his obligations. The surviving grandchild, who would have taken in default
of appointment, claimed that the appointment was invalid. The trial
court held the appointment valid and ruled that the limitation on the
65. State street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25, 121 AJL.R.
796 (1939); see Hill v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 229 Mass. 474, 476, 118
N.E. 891, 892 (1918); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200, 203-04 (1879).
66. 5 AmspiucAN LAw OF PROPERTY 503 (Casner ed. 1952).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

GPiswoLD, SPENDTHRIT TRUSTS §§ 94-95 (2d ed. 1947).
229 Mass. 474, 118 N.E. 891 (1918).
See id. at 476, 118 N.E. at 892.
126 Mass. 200 (1879).
GRisWOLD, op. cit. supra note 67, at § 94.
302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25, 121 A.L.R. 796 (1939).
Id. at 329, 19 N.E.2d at 26.
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power was invalid as an improper limitation upon the general power
of appointment. On appegl this decision was upheld. It should be
noted, however, that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
indicated some hesitation in following the Restatement comment to
the extent of saying that a power may never be so limited:
"The power was a general one; the subsequent provision, that the property
appointed should not be appropriated to or for any debts or liabilities of
the donee's, we think was a direction to the trustees, who would be the
only persons who could 'pay,' and a restriction upon them rather than a
limitation upon the power to appoint. Such an intent cannot be given
effect.... [The Restatement comment] goes further, we think, than we
are required to go in the instant case, where the provision is not a specific
one that the property shall not be appointed to the donee's creditors, but
is one which follows the grant of the general power....74
Since the question before the court was not whether the creditors
oP the donee could reach the property when he had appointed7 5 but
rather whether he could appoint direct to the creditors, and since in
the case of the "non-general" power it is clear that the donee is specifically prohibited from appointing to creditors, the argument of the
creditors based on the Kissel case seems greatly weakened.
This leads to the final and most telling argument against the
creditors' claims. The two lines of authority relied upon by the creditors, i.e., that there can be no spendthrift limitations on gifts of
principal and that no such limitations may be attached to a general
power, assume that the "non-general" power is actually either full
ownership or a general power. Even if the power is treated as an
interest in property, it is not an unlimited one. The donee may not appoint directly to himself or creditors. The argument seems strong
that he may not even indirectly benefit either himself or creditors
through appointments to others. He is not in fact the complete owner
of the property, therefore. The doctrine which allows creditors to
reach appointive assets under a general power has received sufficient
criticism76 to make a court unwilling to extend its application to this
situation. If the court does so extend the doctrine, it is saying to the
donee that although he lacks the complete benefits of ownership he
is going to be saddled with the burdens of ownership. This hardly
74. Id. at 335, 336, 19 N.E.2d at 28, 29.
75. In the course of its opinion the court does say that the appointments
should be set aside and the creditors all take pro rata shares, the appointees
taking as creditors rather than as appointees. Id. at 335-36, 19 N.E.2d at 29.
However, the lower court had not been asked to so rule as far as the report
discloses, and the appeal was taken only by the taker in default as to the
validity of the appointment, so that the question of whether the creditors as
such could reach the appointive assets seems not to have been directly before
the court.
76. See supra p. 62 and authorities cited note 48 supra.
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seems the proper result in a court which professes to act on principles
of equity and justice.
If the donee of the "non-general" power should become bankrupt,
the trustee in bankruptcy may claim either that he becomes vested
with the "non-general" power under Section 70 (a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act which vests in the trustee "powers which he [the bankrupt]
might have exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might
have exercised solely for some other person,"7 7 or that he gets a lien
on the appointive assets under Section 70 (c) which gives the trustee
a lien on all property, whether within the possession or control
of the
bankruptcy court, on which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained an equitable or legal lien on the date of the bankruptcy. 78 The
arguments made in the preceding section indicate that there is serious
doubt that this power would be treated as one which might be exercised for the donee's benefit. The arguments made in this section
indicate the difficulties of finding that the creditors could obtain any
lien on the property subject to the non-general power, even after the
death of the donee, much less while he is still living. Therefore, the
claims of the trustee in bankruptcy should be denied by the court.
IV
The two problems discussed above are closely connected with the
taxability of the "non-general" power of appointment, since if the donee is permitted to exercise the power so as to confer an indirect benefit on himself or his creditors, or if the creditors of the donee are permitted to reach the appointive assets after any appointment, the tax
authorities may well claim that the power should be treated as a "general power" under the present tax law.7 9 The final problem, however, is
not so intimately related to the tax law, but rather presents a situation where the attempt to avoid taxation may lead to some difficulty
with purely property principles, i.e., how the Rule against Perpetuities
is to be applied to the "non-general" power. At the same time, there
are some tax considerations involved in this question, for under the
existing law if a power is exercised so as to create a second power
which may under state law postpone the vesting of an estate, or
suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation, for a period
"ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first
power," the first power is includable in the donee's estate 80 and the
creation of the second power is treated as a transfer by the donee
77. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 66 STAT. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
110(a) (3) (1953).
78. 36 STAT. 838 (1910), as amended, 66 STAT. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C.A. §
110(c) (1953).

79. But cf. unpublished ruling of the Commissioner cited in note 53 supra.

80. INT. REv. CODE § 811 (f) (4).
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under the gift tax.8 ' At present, only the State of Delaware allows any
power other than a general power exercisable by deed to be so exercised as to postpone the vesting of interests for a period measured
without regard to the date of creation of the original power.8 2 However, if the Rule against Perpetuities is so applied to the "non-general"
power as to permit the creation of interests whose validity depends
not on the date of creation but on the date of exercise, the property
subject to the power may be taxable under these provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Actually the application of the Rule raises not one but two questions: (1) Does the "non-general" power itself violate the Rule? (2)
Does the exercise of the power violate the Rule?
The common-law Rule against Perpetuities is:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
83
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.
This rule prevails in all jurisdictions of the United States except
Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
In most of these states there is a statutory period of perpetuities. 84
Louisiana, having the civil law rather than the common law of
property, has no doctrine of perpetuities as such.8 5 Pennsylvania, although adopting the common-law period of perpetuities, applies it to
interests not on the basis of the possibilities of vesting existing at the
date of creation but on the basis of actual vesting within the period.80
The following discussion is primarily based on the common-law Rule,
but may be equally applicable to the statutory versions since it turns
not on the period of perpetuities but rather on the application of that
period to particular interests.
In general, Gray asserts that any power which can be exercised at a
time beyond the limits of the Rule is bad.8 7 The reason back of this
81. INT. REv. CODE § 1000 (c)(4).
82. Delaware provides by statute that the period of perpetuities shall be
measured from the date of exercise of powers and that the powers are to be
treated as if created when exercised. DEL. REv. CODE § 4414 (1935).
83. GRAY, op. cit. supranote 63, at 191.
84. These statutes may be characterized as follows: (1) those adopting a
period of two lives in being, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42; N.Y. PEns. PROP.
LAW § 11; (2) those adopting a period of multiple lives in being, with an
alternative of twenty-five years in gross, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1948);
(3) those adopting independent systems, MIss. CODE ANN. § 838 (1942) (an
interest may be given to "a succession of donees then living" and on the death
of the survivor "to any person or any heir"), Wis. STAT. §§ 230.14, 230.15,
230.23 (1951) (lives in being plus thirty years as to realty).
Three states have enacted by statute the common law period of perpetuities.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 715.1, 715.2 (Supp. 1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-102 to 45104, 45-823 (1951); Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.220 (1948).
85. Whiteside, Statutory Rules: Perpetuitiesand Accumulations, 6 AMErICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY § 25.88 (Casner ed. 1952).
86. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).

87. GRAY, op.cit. supra,note 63, at 464.
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doctrine is that any future interest which has the effect of preventing
the absolute vesting of a fee simple absolute within the period is bad.
Since a power of appointment can assure the final vesting of all fee
simple interests no earlier than its exercise, or termination by death
of the donee or release, if it may be exercised beyond the limits of
the Rule, it will be bad. 88 In a few states there are statutory provisions
making an interest following a power vest without regard to the
existence of the power. 89 There is an exception to the general rule,
however, if the power is a general power exercisable by deed, and if
the power must vest in the donee within the period of perpetuities. 90
This follows from the basic idea that a presently exercisable general
power is the equivalent of complete ownership of the appointive
property. The moment such a power vests in the donee, he becomes,
for the purposes of the Rule, the owner of the property in fee.
In the case of the "non-general" power stated above, since the donee
is living at the time of the donor's death, or never, the Rule would not
be violated. However, if a "non-general" power is created in a person
not yet born at the date of creation, so that it may be exercised beyond
the period of perpetuities, the Rule might be violated. As we have
seen in the previous discussion, in spite of the great breadth of this
power, which might argue for treatment as a general power, the
limitations imposed on the donee are real limitations. Underlying the
Rule against Perpetuities is a policy of not allowing the alienation of
property to be restricted for too long a period. Slight though they may
be, the restraints on the donee's power are sufficient to bring this policy
into play, since there is no absolutely vested interest in the donee,
or in the taker in default, except in states allowing the interest in
default of appointment to vest in spite of the existence of the power. 91
When we consider the application of the Rule to the exercise of the
power, we find a similar divergence of result depending upon the
nature of the power. All powers other than general powers presently
exercisable place a restraint on alienation or vesting and therefore in
measuring the period of perpetuities the beginning date is the time
of creation rather than the date of exercise of the power. 92 On the
88. E.g., Burlington County Trust Co. v. Di Castelcicala, 2 N.J. 214, 66 A.2d
164 (1949); see Leach and Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,
6 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY 93 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, op. cit. supra note
63, at 464-65.
89. The following states provide that general or special powers shall not
affect the vesting of the remainders following them. CAL. Civ. CODE § 781
(1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-207 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-522
(1947); N.D. REV. CODE § 47.0423 (1943); OELA. STAT. tit. 60, § 43 (1951); S.D.
CODE § 51.0422 (1939).

90. E.g., Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N.J. Eq. 366, 189 AtI.
653 (1937); see Appeal of Appleton, 136 Pa. 354, 364, 20 Atl. 521, 522 (1890);
see 6 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY 63 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 63, at 471.
91. See note 89 supra.
92. E.g., Heald v. Briggs, 83 Conn. 5, 74 Ati. 1123 (1910) (special power);
Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352 (1888) (special power); St. Louis Union Trust
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other hand, if the power is general and exercisable by deed there is no
.restraint on alienation and therefore the period for determining the
validity of interest created by the exercise is measured from the date
of exercise.93 Of course, the validity of interests created by special or
testamentary powers is determined with regard to the facts as they
appear at the date of exercise, e.g., the fact that all the children of the
donee were in being at the date of creation, so that any interest given
to the grandchildren of the donee when they reach twenty-one will
be valid.94
Since the "non-general" power does have the effect of placing a
restraint on alienation and preventing the vesting of fee simple absolutes from the date of creation, the period of perpetuities must be
measured from the date of creation rather than from the date of exercise. It would be unlikely, therefore, that the application of the Rule
Co. v. Basset, 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569, 101 A.L.R. 1266 (1935)

(general

testamentary power); American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46

S.E.2d 104 (1948)

(general testamentary power); see 6

AMERICAN LAW OF

98-99 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, op. cit. supra note 63, at 498-99.
The late Professor Albert M. Kales disagreed with Professor Gray's statement
that the period of perpetuities as applied to general testamentary powers
should be measured from the date of creation. Kales argued that the donee
of such a power was at the time of his death in complete control of the property
and therefore the purpose behind the Rule was not violated by treating interests created by testamentary exercise as valid if they vested in interest
within lives in being at the date of the exercise plus twenty-one years. Kales,
General Powers and the Rule against Perpetuities,26 HARV. L. REV. 64 (1912).
This position has never received wide acceptance, only one state having followed it clearly. Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927). The
majority of American jurisdictions follow Gray's statement of the Rule. E.g.,
Minot v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918).
Delaware measures all periods of perpetuities from the date of the exercise
of the powers creating interests. See note 82 supra.
Several states have adopted a New York statutory rule that in determining
the validity of interests created by the exercise of a power, the period of perpetuities is measured from the date of the creation of the power rather than
from the date of exercise. MIca. Comp. LAWS § 556.55 (1948); NXY. REAL PROP.
LAw § 178; Alum. STAT. ANN. § 502.73 (West 1947); N.D. REv. CoDs § 59.0536
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 237 (1951); S.D. CODE § 59.0434 (1939); WIs. STAT.
§ 232.52 (1951).
93. Appeal of Mifflin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525 (1888); see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY 97 (Casner ed. 1952); GRAY, op. cit. supra note 63, at 509-10.
There is some question as to whether the New York statute, cited note 92
supra, applies to general powers presently exercisable, which may be treated
as absolute powers of alienation under other provisions of the New York
statute. See note 52 supra. The Restatement says that in the case of a
presently exercisable general power, the period of perpetuities should be
measured from the date of exercise even in New York. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY,
A2P'NDix ff 36 (1944). There is also persuasive dictum in Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 276-77, 85 N.E. 59, 62 (1908). The Minnesota
statute specifically excepts from its provisions a general power presently exercisable. Mxnv. STAT. ANN. § 502.73 (West 1947). See also Delaware rule,
note 82 supra.
94. Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1940); Minot v.
Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918). Pennsylvania provides by statute
that the validity of future interests under the Rule shall be determined by
whether they in fact do vest within lives in being at creation plus twenty-one
years, rather than by the possibility of non-vesting occurring as of the date
of creation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).
PROPERTY,
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would ever have the effect of making the "non-general" power taxable
under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.95
V
In considering the proper characterization of the hypothetical power
at the beginning of this article, the conclusion was reached that while
it was not within the classical or the tax definitions of a "general"
power, it was still too broad to be brought within the term "special"
power, and that it might better be characterized as "non-general" and
the rule to be applied in any specific situation determined independent
of the over-all classification. 96 In each of the three problem situations,
the conclusion was reached that in that specific situation the "nongeneral" power should not be treated as general powers would be.
Under such a power the donee should be precluded from conferring
either direct or indirect benefits on the excluded persons.97 The donee's
creditors should be denied any equitable claim to the appointive assets
if an exercise is made.93 The power should be considered as suspending
the absolute vesting of interests from the date of creation rather than
from the date of exercise in applying the Rule against Perpetuities, 99
with the exception of certain cases covered by specific statutory language. 100 And now we come back to the original question of whether
the power should be employed at all.
This is, of course, a question which should be answered by the client
after the probable results of the use of the "non-general" power have
been presented by the estate planner. In addition to the factors already considered, the estate planner should also add the following
points.
First, as was pointed out by Professor Leach in 1939, the donor rarely
is interested in having the donee appoint outside the family of either
of them.1 1 Likewise it is rare that the donee is interested in making
an appointment outside the family circle, except for possible charitable
gifts. Therefore, in most situations a more limited power of appointment, designating the possible appointees as a discernible class may
be sufficient. 10 2 If there is some question as to whether the donee will
95. INT. REV. CODE §§ 811 (f) (4), 1000 (c) (4).
96. See supra p. 59.
97. See supra p. 60.
98. See suprapp. 66-67.
99. See suprapp. 67-71.
100. See note 89 supra.
101. See Leach, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A
Dissent, 52 HARV. L. REV. 961, 964, 966 (1939).
102. Such a power might be drafted as follows: "I give the rest and residue
of my estate to the X Trust Co., to hold in trust and to pay the income to
my son, Doe, for life, and on Doe's death to pay over the principal to such of
my issue (including adopted children and illegitimate children), or their
spouses (including widows or widowers of deceased issue) not including Doe's
estate or his creditors, or to such charities as Doe may appoint by will or by
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want to make gifts outside the family, or if the donor wishes the donee
to be able to receive some benefit from the appointive property other
than income, the estate planner may use one of the powers specifically
excluded from "general powers" under the Revenue Code; i.e., a power
to consume or invade principal for the benefit of the donee limited by
an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support
or maintenance of the donee, 103 or a power to appoint to the donee held
in conjunction with either the donor or a person having a substantial
10 4
adverse interest in the exercise of the power.
Second, the estate planner may point out that although the conclusions reached above as to the proper treatment of the "non-general"
power seem correct, the courts may not accept the arguments which
have been put forward in favor of these conclusions, and may treat the
power as a general power subject to spendthrift trusts. Also there is
a possibility that if the "non-general" power became widely used the
tax law would be amended to make it taxable. These possibilities
indicate that there is some danger that the purpose of the donor, to
have a power which would not be subject to creditors' claims or
taxation, may not be accomplished.
Finally, the very possibility of arguments in favor of treating the
power as general, whether or not ultimately successful, should prove
a deterrent to the use of the "non-general" power. The estate planner
should not attempt a "high wire" act with his client's property, but
should attempt to satisfy the desires of the client in the clearest possible language and with the least possibility of contest and to indicate
to the client where his desires may lead to later difficulties. Let him
who would play the legal acrobat take warning from the renowned case
of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce and its disastrous results.105 While the delays
written instrument attested by two witnesses during his lifetime, and in de-

'fault of such appointment to the issue of Doe who survive him, per stirpes,

and in default of issue surviving Doe to Vanderbilt University." For a fuller
discussion of some of the problems of drafting powers under the 1951 Act,

and some examples, see Johnson, Powers of Appointment, 29 TAxEs 965 (1951);
Lauritzen, DraftingPowers of Appointment under the 1951 Act, 47 N.W.L. REv.
314 (1952).
103. INT. REv. CODE § 811 (f) (3) (A). Such a power might be drafted as
follows: "The trustee shall pay over to Doe out of the principal such sums as
are necessary for his support and maintenance or for medical expenses, as he
may direct from time to time in writing." See articles cited note 102 supra.
104. INT. REv. CODE § 811(f) (3) (C). Such a power might be drafted as follows: "I give the rest and residue of my estate to the X Trust Co., to hold in
trust and to pay the income thereof to my son, Doe, for life, and to pay over
the principal on Doe's death to such of my issue (including adopted and
illegitimate children) or their spouses (including widows or widowers of
deceased issue), not including Doe's estate or creditors, or such charities as
Doe may appoint by will, and in default of appointment to the issue of Doe
(including adopted or illegitimate children) who survive him, per stirpes. I
further direct that the trustee shall pay to Doe out of principal during his
lifetime such sums as shall be directed in writing jointly by Doe and his
eldest issue then living." See articles cited note 102 supra.
105. See DIcKENs, BLEAK HOUSE (1853) passim.
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of equity may be less today than in Dickens' time, the costs of litigation
are hardly negligible, even for the successful suitor.
If the client still is desirous of having the broadest of powers possible, and does not want to use either of the excepted powers stated
above, it may be the wisest plan to tell him that he should use a general
power and make some provision for the payment of taxes which will
follow the use of such power. The use of the "non-general" power
seems to raise too many difficulties to justify its use as a tax avoidance
device. The "non-general" power of appointment should remain what
it apparently is today, an interesting hypothetical for the classroom
and the legal periodical.

